Yesterday the story of New England’s cod fishery took another tragic turn when the New England Fishery Management Council voted to drastically cut catch limits for New England’s two cod stocks—Gulf of Maine and Georges Bank cod—by 77 and 61 percent, respectively.

The Council’s action follows months of scientific debate on appropriate catch limits for cod. Recent assessments showed stocks at the lowest levels ever recorded and declining rapidly:

• Georges Bank cod biomass is at just 7% of healthy, sustainable levels.
• Gulf of Maine cod biomass is at 13-18% of healthy, sustainable levels.
• The last better-than-average year for young Georges Bank cod production was 1991.
• The amount of younger fish becoming available for fishing, known as recruitment, has been at the lowest estimated levels ever for the last five years running.

Confirming this dismal outlook, fishermen have been unable to find enough cod to even come close to filling their small quotas. The fish just aren’t there any more.

Despite this grim outlook, some in the industry asked for interim measures that would allow devastating overfishing to continue for yet another year, and the Massachusetts fisheries agency representative on the Council inexplicably asked for catch levels that were higher than the highest recommendations from scientists. NOAA regional administrator John Bullard rejected these efforts as legally and biologically unjustifiable.

Bullard told the Council yesterday that the “day of reckoning” for the fishery had arrived and that further management denial about the true state of the stocks could not be sanctioned. In this context, the Council chose to cut the catch – even in the face of industry opposition.

But the action to cut cod quota did not go far enough. The options implemented by the Council are the least aggressive cuts allowable by law, and under some assessments they still authorize overfishing. They push the limits of scientific advice and put the short-term economic interests over the long-term health of New England’s cod fishery and the viability of a whole generation of groundfishermen. Years of similarly short-sighted decision-making have caused the current biological disaster.

The Council unanimously rejected a motion to shut down the cod fishery entirely—an option that the NMFS Regional Director labeled as irresponsible, but one that may be the only chance for the recovery of New England’s cod stocks.

Canada took similar action to shut down its cod fishery in 1992, when its stocks were in a state remarkably similar to New England’s current disaster. Even their action in retrospect was too little and too late to avert a social and economic calamity; tens of thousands of people were put out of work, and cod stocks have still not fully recovered.

Unlike Canada, however, New England fishing communities are unlikely to see massive disaster relief funds. The New England Fishery Management Council now owns this problem and will bear full responsibility for the long term biological and socio-economic  consequences of their decision. While CLF hopes that the Council’s gamble is not reckless, decades of bad Council bets in the past and the current scientific advice do not bode well. Time will tell.

Now is not the time for denial. It is not the time for timid decisions and taking unconscionable risks. It is time to make the painful, necessary steps towards a better future for fishing in New England. Rather than arguing over the scraps left after decades of mismanagement, we should shut the cod fishery down and protect whatever cod are left.

This week, the federal First Circuit Court of Appeals in Boston dashed the hopes of the cities of New Bedford and Gloucester to throw out the management structure that has been in place since May 2010 for harvesting cod, haddock, flounder and other groundfish. The court upheld a prior decision by the district court in favor of the government and CLF, which intervened on the side of federal agencies. The carefully written and thoroughly considered 68-page opinion demolished every claim brought by New Bedford, calling New Bedford’s views in one case “misguided,” in another “inaccurate”, and in a third as having “no textual basis for the argument.”

At stake was the validity of the significant new management plan that was adopted by the regional fishery management council in 2010 and approved by the National Marine Fisheries Service that same year.

The judicial review of this plan bordered on frivolous. The 60,000+ page administrative record memorializing the decision to approve the new program provides extensive documentation on each and every decision made. New Bedford and Gloucester barely participated in that public process but nevertheless felt at liberty to drag the issue into court for two years. As the Court concluded: “the record demonstrates that the [National Marine Fisheries Service] engaged in reasoned decision-making and reached rational outcomes to hard choices.” That is what good fisheries management is all about. It’s never easy and there are always winners and losers, but decisions have to be made.

In this case, an overhaul was desperately needed. As the First Circuit said in its decision, “[t]wo decades of [a different form of fishing limits on the industry] has left the [f]ishery’s stocks on the brink of collapse.”

The new plan, created by Amendment 16 to the Northeast Multispecies Fishery Management Plan, accomplished two goals. First and most importantly from a conservation perspective, scientific opinion became paramount in setting catch levels, removing the politics that had previously trivialized scientists’ warnings about the risks of overharvesting. As a result of using scientifically-set fishing limits, the amount of groundfish that was available to the fleet at the beginning of the fishing year on May 1, 2010 was drastically reduced.

The second accomplishment of the new plan was the expansion of the “sector program,” an approach that had been pioneered in the region by the Cape Cod Commercial Hook Fishermen’s Association. The sector program allowed fishermen to form voluntary organizations in which they could pool their catch allotment and re-distribute it amongst themselves in any way that made the most economic sense to them. Since they were guaranteed a set amount of fish, they could choose when to fish, freeing them up to wait for high wholesale prices or good weather or to reserve some quota for late season holidays like Easter, which always brought strong prices. In return for forming the sectors and agreeing to be bound by the “hard” quota of fish, other regulations were relaxed, further increasing the potential for efficient operations.

It is a mystery to me why New Bedford and Gloucester, and their Congressional allies U.S. Representatives Frank and Tierney, tried to blow this new scheme up in court. None of their publicly stated reasons hold much water, and the Massachusetts representatives, including those from New Bedford, overwhelmingly approved the plan in 2010.

Perhaps the best explanation is that the lawsuit provided a handful of political demagogues with an opportunity to decry federal oversight of the public’s fisheries. In doing so, they diverted scarce federal management resources away from solving fisheries problems, no doubt spent significant municipal dollars on a fruitless goose chase, and intentionally destabilized and attacked a new management system in the front pages of their local papers. Now that the challenge to Amendment 16 is behind us, we can better focus our efforts on restoring the prosperity of this region’s fisheries.

New Bedford v. Locke Opinion – First Circuit Court of Appeals

In 2010, CLF and three other Massachusetts conservation groups walked away from water policy discussions, terminally frustrated that the talks would produce any meaningful change that would stem the increasing trend of streams being drawn dry by public and private water suppliers.  To his credit, Governor Patrick encouraged us to come back to the table with a promise that the fundamental protection for fish provided under the water supply law, the so-called “safe yield” limit, would be interpreted by the state to protect fish populations.

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has now released the long-awaited fruits of those renewed discussions: the “Sustainable Water Management Initiative” Framework. The Commonwealth promotes this initiative, called SWMI, as a “substantial improvement” on the regulatory framework for providing for essential public water supply services while protecting the Commonwealth’s freshwater fish and other aquatic populations. But is it? What benefits does SWMI produce over current conditions? Does this effort still fall short of the Governor’s promise?

On the positive side, SWMI vaults Massachusetts into the forefront in the country in my opinion with respect to its knowledge base of its rivers and streams. The state’s partnership here with the U.S. Geological Survey has produced a set of stream and stream flow analytical tools and a streams data base that allow the state to understand the ecological impacts of various flow regimes  in a stream, very close to the gold standard.

Similarly, Massachusetts regulators and biologists are now much better informed on the risk to wildlife and river ecosystems associated with water withdrawals for water supplies. It turns out that these aquatic biological communities are much more sensitive to stream flow fluctuations than previously assumed. While this linkage might have been qualitatively suspected before, the last two years of analytical work have now unequivocally quantified that fragile connection.

Massachusetts also has demonstrated through this process that it has some remarkable and dedicated public employees who performed the work with the highest level of professional skill. The Commonwealth is in very good hands at a technical level.

Finally, this initiative will help ensure that some of the highest quality streams in the Commonwealth will be protected to a greater degree than they are today against degradation. While the additional levels of protection will depend on the regulations that are ultimately passed and the implementation of those regulations by the agency, SWMI will provide another level of protection to those near-pristine stream segments.

Where the technical side of SWMI is robust and innovative, however, the policy side of SWMI is compromised and unlikely to produce significant ecological protection in more heavily impacted stream segments or restore stream flows to rivers that are currently being drawn dry by water supply withdrawals.

The “safe yield” tool in SWMI, which the Governor Patrick assured us would include an environmental protection factor, doesn’t really protect the environment. “Safe yield” is a stream flow calculation that is meant to set a maximum amount of water that can be diverted from a water source without adversely affected native biota.

SWMI throws out this tool as a regulatory limit for all practical purposes in many rivers including, for example the Ipswich River, an important water body that water suppliers drain every year in the summer. This results from the fact that SWMI averages the safe yield calculation over the whole watershed and on an annual basis. Because this averaging includes the late winter and spring floods, it shows high levels of safe yield even when a river is going dry in August.  It just isn’t a protective approach in any sense.

SWMI and the Commonwealth rely on other tools and regulatory tactics to avoid this result by requiring water suppliers to minimize their adverse stream impacts “to the maximum extent practicable.” The policy also goes to great length to protect water allocations from the 1980’s when the water supply law was first passed. There is nothing in the law that requires this continued grandfathering of water withdrawals in situations where there is harm to streams and such an outcome is just not good enough.

Massachusetts is fortunate to have abundant natural water supplies, receiving some 44 inches on average a year–Los Angeles gets about 10-11 inches. There is no real conflict between essential water services and healthy stream flows in Massachusetts that cannot be technically solved at reasonable costs. Unfortunately, however, while the framework may drive water use down, SWMI seems to reduce rather than increase the incentives water suppliers and municipalities have to use water smarter. All CLF can do at this point is wait to see whether the Commonwealth demonstrates through its implementation of SWMI that CLF’s concerns are misplaced.

MassDEP and the Executive Office of Energy and Environmental Affairs worked hard to find a path forward that municipalities and conservationists could both embrace. And the answers, needless to say, are not easy. The politics of water supply in Massachusetts are complex and often confrontational as they are in most states. Nevertheless, we had hoped for more for the Commonwealth’s rivers and streams.

In 2011, CLF Ventures, the strategy-consulting arm of CLF, received a grant from the EPA to help two New England fishing/whale watching vessels replace the aging, inefficient engines on their vessels with cleaner-burning, more efficient four-stroke diesel engines. In this video, Captain Brad Cook of the Atlantic Queen II and Captain Chris Charos of Captain’s Fishing Parties reveal how the EPA grant and CLF Ventures enabled them to update their vessels’ technology, reducing emissions and substantially cutting their fuel use:

The EPA’s National Clean Diesel Funding Assistance program is designed to reduce air pollution and exposure to diesel fumes by covering up to 75% of the cost of an engine upgrade or repower. Replacing an outdated engine with the clean-burning technology used by Captain Brad and Captain Chris reduces asthma-causing particulate matter emissions by 63 percent and smog-producing nitrogen oxide emissions by 40 percent.

The program also cuts down on greenhouse gas emissions by improving efficiency and reducing fuel use by up to 14 percent. Fuel use is a serious concern for the fishing industry. A 2005 report published in AMBIO revealed that in 2000, the industry consumed about 13 million gallons of fuel, or 1.2 percent of global consumption. If the fishing industry were a country, it would be the world’s 18^th-largest consumer of oil—on par with the Netherlands. Fishing is also one of the only industry sectors to consistently become less fuel-efficient in recent years. With declining stocks sending fishermen farther from shore, this problem will only become more severe without significant investments and improvements in technology. Programs like EPA’s Diesel Emissions Reduction Program play an important role in greening the fishing fleet and helping to make fishing more sustainable.

The program isn’t just good for the environment; it’s also good for fishermen. A more efficient engine can save a fisherman 9,500 gallons of fuel per year, cutting fuel costs and increasing profit margins. Crew aboard these vessels reduce their exposure to harmful diesel fumes, which were recently classified as carcinogenic by the World Health Organization and placed in the same category as deadly toxins like asbestos and arsenic.  Consumers asking for sustainable options will appreciate the reductions in emissions and fuel use, too, and recreational fishermen and whale watchers aboard vessels with new engines can enjoy a quieter, cleaner ride.

Still, new engines can only go so far in cleaning up the fishing fleet. The industry is built on technology that made sense decades ago, when fuel was cheap, fish were more plentiful close to shore, and consumers weren’t demanding sustainable seafood choices. Down the line, greening the fleet will mean rebuilding it from the water up and introducing lighter, safer vessels that inherently use less fuel.

This post was originally published on CLF’s fisheries blog, TalkingFish.org.

This post refers to an oral argument held in the First Circuit Court of Appeals on September 5, 2012.  To listen to an audio recording of the argument, click here.

On Wednesday, a panel of three Federal Circuit Court judges heard arguments from various parties regarding why the 2010 amendment to the New England Groundfish Management Plan, Amendment 16 as it is known, should either be thrown out or upheld. Among the folks asking the court to throw out the amendment were the cities of New Bedford and Gloucester, whose mayors sat prominently in the room. I was representing Conservation Law Foundation’s interests to the panel and advancing our view that Amendment 16 was both crucial at the time because of the looming catch limit reductions as well as being well within the law.  A decision is expected shortly.

The judges were clearly puzzled during the argument by the same question that has puzzled many of us repeatedly over the course of this two-plus year legal fight: what were the appellants’ motives in bringing this challenge and what did they hope to get from the court even if they were successful?

And why New Bedford and Gloucester? Their Council representatives all voted for the Amendment 16 package even though—like most everyone involved—they strongly objected to parts of Amendment 16. What do those two cities gain by throwing the management system into chaos by their judicial challenges? Gross revenues of most New Bedford-based boats and from all New Bedford groundfish have climbed dramatically under Amendment 16. To a lesser extent, Gloucester is also better off in gross revenues. The Port of Portland certainly has suffered in recent years, but they did not challenge Amendment 16.  The Court clearly wanted to understand the larger context of the challenge.

The cities argued that they were in court to stop consolidation but, wait a minute, haven’t fishing operations based in Gloucester and New Bedford accounted for a lot of the consolidation? Were they there protecting the interests of the small boat coastal fleet?  No one has ever seriously accused New Bedford of being a champion of the regional small boat fleet in the past although it would be welcome now.

And why go to court when it is patently obvious to many of us that some components of the coastal day boat fleet remain at serious risk until near-shore groundfish populations fully recover, which may not happen soon enough, if ever. There are any number of immediate management actions that New Bedford and Gloucester could be championing at the Council to support survival of day boats; their silence on such matters is striking in that forum.

To me, it didn’t seem like the panel members ever got a convincing answer from New Bedford or Gloucester’s lawyer. I suspect there are a variety of motives behind this effort: fishermen who can show that Amendment 16 irreparably hurt their businesses and ways of life, political ideologues advancing some romantic, largely inaccurate notion of the business of fishing , and business interests who are somehow economically advantaged by keeping the groundfishery in chaos. The political motives may be as simple as press ink: a fish fight almost always makes the front pages, even if it is … well, a fish story.

The court is going to do what it does; as one of the judges observed dryly: “statutory construction issues are not without interest….” A judicial setback of Amendment 16 is unlikely but even if that should happen, no one has seriously proposed a better alternative. What really troubles me about all of this activity is the distraction of it all. Some fishermen are really suffering for circumstances they did not bring down on themselves and strategic infrastructure like the Portland Fish Exchange are hanging on by a thread.

I have been doing this sort of legal work for more than thirty years and I can promise one thing: nothing, let me repeat, nothing that comes from the First Circuit Court of Appeals will make any sort of a difference to those troubles.

The only thing that will make a difference is commitment to a process that abandons slogans and propaganda and focuses on solutions. There is a lot of talent and interest throughout the region in solving some of these problems and there is no question that the region is at some sort of tipping point.

With New Bedford and Gloucester on board, it now seems that there is broad consensus that the small scale, mostly coastal boat fleet may be at a structural disadvantage that needs to be corrected and that time is of the essence. Rather than fund lawyers, why couldn’t New Bedford and Gloucester lead some problem-solving workshops that would tackle these questions for which they profess so much passion.  We don’t even have to wait for the Council to guide the process.

This post was originally published on TalkingFish.org.

Despite its caption, the “Transparent and Science-Based Fishery Management Act of 2012,” H.R. 6350, introduced by U.S. Representative John Runyun of New Jersey just hours before Congress adjourned for summer recess on August 2^nd is a misguided piece of legislation.  It brings political interference and micro-management back into fisheries management, thwarts science-based decisions, costs jobs and any hope of increased prosperity for hundreds of fishing families, eliminates government and fisherman accountability for a public resource, and reverses the painful progress and sacrifice that has been made in recent years to restore many of America’s once-bountiful fisheries.

New England certainly doesn’t need this bill.  All it would do here is to pull fishing families and businesses back into the tar pit of mismanagement and economic and social decline from which they have been struggling to escape for the past two decades. Whatever Representative Runyan’s intentions might be, the only outcome this legislation guarantees is more chaos and productivity losses in this nation’s fisheries.

In 2006, important accountability provisions were introduced into the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and recent reviews of fisheries management indicate that they are working to rebuild fish stocks. Despite this success, Representative Runyun is trying to un-do these provisions. In 2006, 28 % of the nation’s fisheries for which data was available were overfished; in those fisheries with adequate data, 26% of them were subject to overfishing. By June 2012, just one or two years after the new Magnuson measures took effect, 23% remained in an overfished condition and overfishing was down to 17%. Not great after 35 years of federal management but headed the right way. Unfortunately, New England’s fish stocks–the poster child for what happens with “management flexibility”—remained among the worst in the nation.

New England managers have destroyed hundreds of good fishing businesses and plummeted cod populations to levels never seen in history by catering to short term economic interests at the expense of long term profitability.  In the New England groundfish fishery, overfishing and mismanagement have resulted in significant revenue losses. If stocks were at managed at sustainable levels, current groundfish revenues could be three times greater – infusing New England’s economy with nearly $170 million in additional dockside revenues compared to 2010 revenues. In New England, we’ve seen the human and ecological damage caused by ”flexible fishery management.” It doesn’t work. Not for the fish and not for the fishermen..

If Congressman Runyun cared about fisheries, he would lead the charge to secure adequate federal appropriations for better research, better stock assessments, more data, better assessment technology research and development, and innovative gear research by fishermen, not file backward laws. Unfortunately, he appears to be more interested in demagoguery and ideology than he is in solving real fisheries problems. From where I sit, his legislation is a political distraction to the real work that needs to be done —  restoring sustainable fisheries and communities in New England.

A recent scientific article from four Maine ocean scientists reminded me of a not-very-good environmental joke. An archangel was reporting to God all the terrible things that humans had done to the earth’s environment. God listened patiently as the list expanded, interjecting regularly that the archangel was not to worry; these events had all been anticipated. But when the angel reported that there was now a hole in the ozone layer, God bolted upright in shock: “I told them not to mess with the ozone layer!”

The article I was reading was not about ozone holes. Obscurely titled Step-changes in the physical, chemical and biological characteristics of the Gulf of Maine, as documented by the GNATS times series, four researchers, led by Dr. William M. Balch from the prestigious Bigelow Laboratory for Ocean Sciences, reported on work they had done looking at a number of data bases of various physical, chemical, and biological markers in the Gulf of Maine. They focused on a series of ship-based sampling data collected between 1998 and 2010.

The researchers reported a startling fact: “[t]he standing stock of phytoplankton … generally decreased since 2005” and there had been a “dramatic” decrease in carbon fixation by phytoplankton across the Gulf of Maine in recent years.

The paper explained this dramatic decrease by pointing to increased precipitation in the Gulf of Maine watersheds in recent years. Four of the eight highest annual precipitation years in the last century in Maine occurred between 1998 and 2010. The data led them to conclude that this increased and atypical precipitation—a commonly predicted phenomenon associated with climate change –interfered with phytoplankton production by discharging increased amounts of colored dissolved organic matter from the watersheds into the Gulf that outcompeted marine plankton for available light.

This is no small matter. Phytoplankton is the base of virtually all marine life in the ocean. Moreover, marine phytoplankton around the world has been estimated to draw more carbon dioxide—a primary climate change gas—from the atmosphere and the oceans than all land plants combined. The punch line to the joke might just as well have been: “I told them not to mess with the phytoplankton!”

While it will take some time before a decline in phytoplankton production in the Gulf of Maine would manifest itself higher up in the marine food web by fewer numbers of high level fishes, the Bigelow researchers were correct to point out that historic high fish productivity in the Gulf of Maine marine system is directly linked to its high productivity of plankton. The health of the marine food web depends on the strength of its planktonic base.

This report’s startling analysis aligns in a troubling way with anecdotal information from fishermen and from fisheries science data that has been surfacing recently. Fish don’t seem to be as large at the different ages as they used to be and a number of predicted strong larval year classes of fish like Atlantic cod have “disappeared” before they became big enough to enter the fishery. Are Gulf of Maine fish failing to thrive like they once did as a consequence of declines in plankton production?

Climate change is happening and its impacts are already being registered in New England. The consequences of our profligate carbon consumption patterns will continue to challenge our ecosystem, our economy, and our way of life through both dramatic and random events that devastate coastal areas as well as chronic ecosystem changes that can be seen at the level of a single-celled phytoplankton. Sadly, it’s no joke.

This piece was originally published on TalkingFish.org.

Federal fishery managers rolled the dice on the New England cod fishery on Monday, once again. It is hard to escape the premonition that they fell well short of their responsibility. We think catch levels were set too high, too little was done to reduce the growing cod catches of recreational fishermen, and nothing was done to balance fishermen’s economic and social pain by directing the small allocation of Gulf of Maine cod toward coastal fishing boats.

The decision of the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) to accept the New England Fishery Management Council’s quota recommendation had little to do with precautionary principles and much to do with politics.

Atlantic cod (photo credit: NOAA).

The 2011 Gulf of Maine cod assessment, which has a broad consensus in the science community, concluded that the fishing levels for the last three years had been set perhaps five times as high as they should have been. A large percentage, sometimes bordering on almost 90% of the spawning cod, has been caught each year in recent times. With few adults older than ten years old in a population that should include significant numbers of highly-reproductive twenty-something-year old fish, the spawning populations are buoyed by little more than the individual year-classes of new maturing fish, year-by-year. The risks of a Gulf of Maine cod train wreck may well be much higher than this decision assumes.

The one thing that is known with certainty about past cod assessments is that they have consistently overestimated the spawning biomass and underestimated the amount of human and natural mortality that is happening in the real world. The scientists are not counting all the fish that are actually being killed each year. In the fisheries modeling world, this sort of systematic model error is called a retrospective pattern. The new assessment, just like prior assessments, is still based on a model exhibiting a retrospective pattern.

What this means in simple language is that while the managers think their new catch levels pose a 30% risk of bringing spawning fish populations down to new historic lows, the real risk is almost guaranteed to be higher – and only time will tell how much higher.  The scientists’ best estimate is that Gulf of Maine cod spawning stock biomass (the amount of the stock that is capable of reproducing) is roughly 11,868 metric tons (mt). By setting new 2012 catch limits at 6,700mt, NMFS and the Council expect that 56% of this spawning population will be caught in the fishing year. But this 11,868mt estimate is just one in a range of estimates; the actual spawning stock biomass could be lower or higher. In fact, the approved 6,700mt catch level could remove anywhere from 41% and 71% of the entire spawning population with equal confidence. Killing two-thirds of the spawners in a population that is already decimated is not rational.

And it is critical to remember that these are just best scientific estimates. The unforeseen cod collapse in Atlantic Canada in the 1990s that has lasted many decades now produced one irrefutable fact: even the smartest people in the room can’t fully understand or predict, let alone control, the biology of a situation. We should be mindful of that if we are to avoid our own cod collapse.

On the brighter side of the NMFS interim cod action, the managers didn’t open up any of the areas that are currently closed to fishing in order to protect important fish habitat and help species rebuild. That would have done little to help Gulf of Maine cod fishermen and much to undermine other rebuilding stocks that likely benefit from these closed areas. Significantly more analysis is needed before that action should be considered.

We are also encouraged to see that additional cod assessments and analysis will be done later this year. There may also be new assessment tools—specifically, the new low frequency sonar technologies developed by MIT and Northeastern—that might finally allow scientists to “see” the fish under the water and get a better real-time estimate of what the total populations of cod might be. All this work is of the highest priority. It would be a great relief if the latest assessment turned out to be overly pessimistic.

The power of denial and the risk of significant bias in these efforts, however, cannot be overstated.  The new analysis must be done right. With so much political pressure, so many fishermen in serious economic straits already, and so many scientists heading into the effort hopeful that a new look at the cod populations might produce a better result, the tendency to skew the inquiry will be practically unavoidable. With the long-term health of Atlantic cod in New England in the balance, however, the integrity of the scientific process must be protected.

There is no way to completely reduce the risks in a fishery, no perfect fishery. Nonetheless, we had started to hope that the New England managers were getting more risk-averse and more focused on realizing the important goal of managing this pivotal fishery out of its persistent crisis state. We hoped that they were becoming more mindful of the bad distributional effects of some of their management rules on the smaller coastal day boats. This latest cod decision negates optimism. It treated that long-term better and fairer future like some game of chance with such long odds that it wasn’t even worth playing.

Photo courtesy of Derek Keats @ flickr. Creative Commons.

Gulf of Maine cod, the lifeline of our inshore fishing fleet up and down the coast of New England, is in a biological crisis. That is why I wrote today to the Honorable John Bryson, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Commerce, calling for federal fisheries disaster relief and interim emergency action. You can read a copy of the letter here, or scroll down to read it below this post.

My letter follows the latest scientific data – data that shows that cod stocks are much more heavily depleted than earlier assessments had indicated. According to the 2011 assessment, based on an improved scientific model, three additional years of survey data and more accurate weights-at-age estimates, Gulf of Maine the spawning cod estimates fell to 12,561 metric tons from 33,877 metric tons in 2008.

In the case of Gulf of Maine cod, the numbers are so close to the bone that a couple thousand metric tons of cod landed either way could spell the difference between a rebounding fishery and a total collapse. Given the economic importance of Gulf of Maine cod to coastal fishermen, what would the appropriate risk be?

Indications are that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) will set a quota of 6,700 metric tons (mt) for the 2012 fishing year that begins May 1. At this level the risk of the spawning population dropping below critical thresholds is greater than 31%. Drop the catch levels to 4,000mt and the risk drops to less than 10%. Still a risk but a safer bet. That is why as I said in my letter, “Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) recommends a one year 4,000mt catch level for the fishing year which starts May 1, 2012. While that level of catch is  2,700mt less than the lowest level proposed by the New England Fishery Management Council, it still presents a significant risk of further stock declines.”

Setting the catch levels too high on May 1, 2012 creates substantial risk that the whole fishery may have to be closed in the future. This isn’t sheer speculation; when Newfoundland’s northern cod fishery – a close cousin of our Gulf of Maine cod – collapsed in the early nineties, the fishery has had to be closed for decades to allow the cod stocks to rebuild.

As I said in my letter, at 4,000mt, “the estimated gross revenue losses at that catch level are $4,677,000. Importantly, an estimated sixty-six percent of those losses will fall on the smaller, inshore fleet (see attachment), a group that is already operating close to or below the economic break-even point and won’t have alternative fishing options in many cases.” Given this, I asked Secretary Bryson to “set up a disaster relief fund available to all active groundfish companies that would provide some relief for any demonstrated losses that they experience until GOM cod stocks can be rebuilt.”

The livelihoods of New England’s coastal fishermen hang in the balance with the Gulf of Maine cod. A three-part solution is required to protect these fishermen and the fish they depend upon.

• First, NMFS should limit the risk of further long-term damage to the fishery by setting the quota at no higher than 4,000 metric tons for the 2012 fishing year. That will buy some time to do further analysis to inform catch limits for 2013 as the nature and extent of the crisis becomes better understood.
• Second, NMFS should allocate those fish to the boats most economically dependent on Gulf of Maine cod, and restrict large trip boats from fishing for them.
• Third, federal and state authorities should declare an economic fishery disaster and make funds available to assist the coastal fishermen who will suffer significant financial losses under any proposed scenario and look towards broader economic assistance for affected coastal communities.

Failing to take the right action for Gulf of Maine cod at this critical junction may well be failing the region’s fishing future. Fast and effective management steps have to be taken to head off that possibility.

—

A copy of the letter I sent to Secretary Bryson can be found below or as a .pdf here.

February 21, 2012
The Honorable John Bryson
Secretary
U.S. Department of Commerce
14th and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20230

RE: Gulf of Maine Cod Federal Fisheries Disaster Relief & Interim Emergency Action

Dear Secretary Bryson:

We are writing to you now to support the earlier requests by Governor Deval Patrick for federal fisheries disaster relief pursuant to section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA). The new scientific assessments for Gulf of Maine cod (GOM cod) stocks document that the economic situation in the region is significantly more dire than previously thought. Immediate and aggressive action is needed to avoid any risk of creating a long-lasting biological crisis with GOM cod with widespread, crippling economic implications.

As a result of the recent science assessment, GOM cod catch levels will have to be drastically cut back on May 1, 2012. Even at low catch levels, there still will be a significant risk that the spawning stock levels could decline below the lowest level ever observed. In the words of one of the New England Council’s scientists who has extensively studied the complete commercial collapse of the northern cod stocks in the early 1990’s off Newfoundland, “the similarities [between the two situations] are a bit frightening.” Dr. J.-J. Maguire (email to SSC members and others 1/25/12). Following that collapse, Newfoundland’s cod stock has been largely closed to fishing for decades.

The recent GOM cod reassessment was a unique and highly unusual set of events that was beyond anyone’s control. The scientists exercised their best professional judgment in performing the original assessment in 2008, the managers strictly followed the scientific harvest level advice, and the fishermen appear to have stayed within their prescribed quota limits. And yet, the future of GOM cod is now at an unforeseen but significant risk. These circumstances meet all the criteria in the National Marine Fisheries Service’s disaster relief policy guidance: there is a fishery resource disaster as defined by the MSA; it was caused by events beyond human control; and there will be significant economic impacts stemming from this disaster.

Economic analysis indicates that single-year gross revenue losses for the commercial fleet from current revenue levels could range from  $1,354,000 to $14,620,000, depending on the catch level that is set. Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) recommends a one year 4,000mt catch level for the fishing year which starts May 1, 2012. While that level of catch is 2,700 metric tons less than the lowest level proposed by the New England Fishery Management Council, it still presents a significant 10% probability of further spawning stock declines.

The estimated gross revenue losses at that catch level are $4,677,000. Importantly, an estimated sixty-six percent of those losses will fall on the smaller, inshore fleet (see attachment), a group that is already operating close to or below the economic break-even point and won’t have alternative fishing options in many cases. We ask that you set up a disaster relief fund available to all active groundfish companies that would provide some relief for any demonstrated losses of net revenues that they experience until GOM cod stocks can be rebuilt.

Without relief from the crushing economic circumstances many coastal boat owners are facing, , managers are being tempted to take risks in setting the short-term quotas too high, potentially imperiling the fishery for decades. A further commercial collapse of GOM cod stocks would cripple many of New England’s fishing communities that are wholly dependent on cod. The indirect losses in the maritime support industries multiply those potential direct costs many times. Economic disaster assistance can greatly reduce the pressure on managers to allow short-term overharvesting as the region transitions to a sustainable fishery. Moreover, in addition to direct disaster relief, we encourage you to implement the suggestions of the Commerce Department Economic Development Administration’s recent evaluation of certain New England ports and provide necessary aid and technical assistance for the economic transition of these communities.

CLF supports the New England Council’s emergency action request and the general approach that the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has proposed in taking interim emergency action to respond to this unexpected and troubling new development. As mentioned above, however, we feel strongly that the quota should be set no higher than 4,000mt. And we have called for the imposition of a series of management measures that would direct the majority of the limited cod quota to the boats that are most dependent on cod. In support of this, we have provided NMFS with a position paper on this issue, which we are also attaching to this letter. Thank you for your careful consideration of the management and economic assistance measures we propose. We look forward to your response and your agency’s further efforts to work towards solutions that help all of New England’s coastal communities weather this tough economic crisis and to thrive in the future.

Sincerely,
Peter Shelley
Vice President